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Abstract. Given its low dollar and maintenance cost, RFID is poised to
become the enabling technology for inventory control and supply chain
management. However, as an outcome of its low cost, RFID based in-
ventory control is susceptible to pernicious security and privacy threats.
A deleterious attack on such a system is corporate espionage, where at-
tackers through illicit inventorying infer sales and restocking trends for
products. In this paper, we first present plausible aftermaths of corporate
espionage using real data from online sources. Second, to mitigate cor-
porate espionage in a retail store environment, we present a simple low-
cost system called Mirage. Mirage uses additional programmable low cost
passive RFID tags called honeytokens to inject noise in retail store inven-
torying. Using a simple history based algorithm that controls activation
and de-activation of honeytokens, Mirage randomizes sales and restock-
ing trends. We evaluate Mirage in a real warehouse environment using
a commercial off-the-shelf Motorola MC9090 handheld RFID reader and
over 450 Gen2 low cost RFID tags. We show that Mirage successfully
flattens and randomizes sales and restocking trends while adding mini-
mal cost to inventory control.
Keywords: RFID, Illicit Inventorying, Honeytokens, Corporate Espi-
onage
1 Introduction
Due to its low dollar and maintenance cost, flexibility, and portability, RFID
is poised to become the enabling technology for inventory control and supply
chain management. In fact, supply chain moguls such as Wal-Mart have already
adopted RFID-based tags and readers for inventory control. Every item in the
retail store is tagged using low cost passive RFID—each tag has an unique iden-
tifier and an antenna and minimal logic circuit to interact with a reader. Unfor-
tunately, in the effort to keep the cost per tag minimal, the wireless communi-
cation between a reader and the tag is highly simplistic—making it susceptible
to pernicious privacy threats [4].
From a supply chain management perspective, a plausible deleterious attack
is corporate espionage [2]. Corporate espionage refers to a threat where a set of
individuals use sale and purchase trends to sabotage a product or a competitor.
To illustrate the gravity of the attack, we present an example in Figure 1. The
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Fig. 1. The figure shows the trend in item sales for two competing video game products
over a period of 6 months. Since the relative trend of product sales determine their
stock prices, if an attacker observes and infers this trend, he can misuse this information
to sabotage the revenue of a company.
figure shows the sales of two competing video game systems from June 2007
to January 2008. The graph depicts real data collected from a market research
analyst group. Through illicit inventorying at representative locations, if a set
of attackers dynamically infer the above trend, they could potentially misuse
the information. For example, since stock prices are determined by the relative
item sales, stock traders could buy company stock when the sales are on the rise
and sell stocks for a competing company whenever there is a dip—such planned
attacks could kill the revenue of the manufacturing company.
At the core of the above privacy threat lies the vulnerability in the enabling
RFID technology. Given the low cost constraint on RFID tags (5-10 cents a
piece), these devices are built with minimal logic circuit. Hence, they respond
to a RFID reader wirelessly in plaintext—making them susceptible to eaves-
dropping attacks. Additionally, commercial off-the-shelf portable RFID readers
can be used to read these tags. Hence, a group of individuals with body worn
RFID readers can continuously inventory a retail store such as Wal-Mart to ac-
cess trends in product purchase and sales. While cryptography on these tags
is a simple solution to prevent illicit inventorying, the cost associated with the
additional hardware circuit is a huge deterrent. Our personal conversation with
officials at Wal-Mart reveals that using cryptographic techniques [15, 9, 3] that
increase tag cost by an order of magnitude is economically infeasible, especially
for low cost items—adding a dollar tag to a bottle of milk worth two dollars is a
50% overhead. Other techniques such as blocker tags [7] that create privacy zones
around a product have not seen the light of the day in corporate environments
due to the associated inventory control overhead. For instance, a Wal-Mart offi-
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cial inventories millions of items multiple times a day—hence overheads of the
order of minutes in reading tags is simply not an option. Additionally, retail store
companies are reluctant to make major changes in their software and hardware
infrastructure. This motivates the need for alternative low cost, low overhead
solutions to mitigate corporate espionage that require minimal change to the
in-place infrastructure.
In this paper, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of Mi-
rage, a RFID-honeytokens based system to minimize corporate espionage. Hon-
eytokens are information security tools that operate on the theory of deception.
Honeytokens are related to honeypots, which are devices used to attract and
trace attackers by presenting a seemingly worthwhile but unprotected computer.
Similarly, the central idea of Mirage is to add additional programmable tags
(honeytokens) that adaptively inject noise in a retail environment to mask dis-
tinguishable sale and purchase trends. The key challenge is to spoof the attacker
into believing that the added tokens are real while minimizing the overhead of
reading additional tags. Mirage uses a simple history-based algorithm and a ran-
dom ID generation algorithm to in-situ determine the number and corresponding
IDs for active honeytokens. By adaptively programming a subset of fake RFID
tags, Mirage hides usable trends in inventorying. We evaluate Mirage in a real
supply chain center using a Motorola MC9090 handheld RFID reader and over
450 Gen2 low cost RFID tags manufactured by Avery-Dennison. Our results
show that Mirage effectively masks several trends in supply chain management.
2 Case for Mirage
In this section, we illustrate the aftermaths of corporate espionage using three
different scenarios. We present a convincing case for Mirage through analysis of
sale and purchase trend data publicly available from marketing research forums.
Note that this data is usually available at a half-yearly or yearly basis—hence,
attackers cannot use this data directly to launch corporate espionage attacks.
Example 1: Consider the sales trend of a popular product over a period of two
months in Figure 2. This data was publicly released by the US Census Bureau.
The sales for the item is constant for a month, followed by a sudden spike
when the items were sold at a discounted rate. This trend repeats itself after a
month. If an attacker, through illicit inventorying at several outlets, deciphers
this trend, he can infer accurate estimates of when the next discounted sale is
likely going to take place—it seems like the manufacturer waits approximately a
period of a month gauging sales and consequently announces a discount event.
Such information can be used to lure customers to delay purchases until the next
discount event, potentially sabotaging a company’s revenues.
Example 2: Figure 3 shows restocking trends for a popular product. This data
from January 2001 to July 2002 was collected from the US Census Bureau of
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Fig. 2. The figure shows a scenario when a
discount of items leads to heavy sales. Cos-
tumers who can study this trend can ac-
curately predict how long they should pro-
crastinate purchases. This could potentially
lead to zero sales for an item.
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Fig. 3. The figure shows a trend that can
be used to understand when restocking oc-
curs in a company. This information could
be used to launch a physical attack on
transportation trucks and inventory houses.
Similar attacks have taken place on banks.
Economics. The items are always restocked once their total falls below a thresh-
old. An attacker can use this information to calculate the probability of a large
restocking event given the number of items in stock. Physical attacks on trans-
portation units carrying the product to retail stores could be apriori planned
by leveraging this information. While other techniques such as “bribing”, and
“hiring individuals” could be used to plan such an attack, we believe that using
illicit inventorying to do this is more “covert”.
Example 3: Figure 1 illustrates one of the more deleterious attacks using illicit
inventorying (this data was collected from a NPD source). The figure shows
the sales trend for two competing video game products. As outlined in §1, a
third party company, through illicit inventorying at different retail locations
in the country can gain access to this trend. Consequently, the manufacturing
company’s stocks can be sabotaged.
3 RFID-based Supply Chain Management
In the past, UPC bar codes were used to physically scan inventory using a light-
based scanner. UPC tags require line-of-sight, which made inventorying tedious
and error-prone. Since then, major retailers have chosen to migrate to RFID
based systems. Figure 5 shows the three components of a RFID-based supply
chain management system. Every item in a retail store such as Wal-Mart is
tagged using passive RFID. A commercial off-the-shelf reader is used to read data
from the tags—a 32-bits EPC (Electronic Product Code) code that identifies the
object type, and an additional unique 32 bits product identifier [4, 5]. Data read
by the scanner is offloaded to an Internet-resident database that keeps track
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Fig. 4. The figure shows how inventorying is done in retail stores such as Wal-Mart.
Off-the-shelf RFID readers are used to read unencrypted data from tags. This data is
offloaded to an Internet-resident database using a Wi-Fi or Bluetooth connection.
of the items that are bought or sold at the retail store. The RFID reader is
networked using Bluetooth or Wi-Fi.
The system is kept intentionally simplistic to minimize cost. Retail store
management involves keeping track of several low-cost items. Adding encryption
to RFID tags is not an economical option since it leads to an order of magnitude
increase in dollar cost per tag. The result being, the system is prone to illicit
inventorying attacks. Since the communication protocol used to offload data
from a tag to a reader (Class1Gen2 [1]) is implemented on most commercial
off-the-shelf readers, intruders with portable RFID readers can easily perform
illicit inventories. If performed at several retail outlets simultaneously, attackers
can infer trends in item sales, purchases, and restocking. This information can
be used to launch several revenue attacks on manufacturers, as illustrated in §2.
4 Mirage
Designing a low overhead, simple system that mitigates corporate espionage is
challenging. First, the system should be low cost—hence encryption-based au-
thentication is not an option. Second, the system should require minimal modi-
fication to the in-place infrastructure for easy adoption in a retail-store environ-
ment such as Wal-Mart. Third, and most importantly the scheme should mask
both sales and restocking trends. To meet these goals, we design Mirage, a system
that uses honeytokens to randomize sales and purchase trends in a retail envi-
ronment. The central idea is to add a small number of additional programmable
passive RFID tags that spoof as real items and inject noise into the retail store
inventorying. However, the research challenge is to determine the optimal num-
ber of additional programmable tags per object type that should be added such
that sales and restocking trends are de-trended. Consequently, when an attacker
performs illicit inventorying, she sees random or flattened sales and restocking.
Mirage uses two inter-twined components (illustrated in Figure 5) to mit-
igate illicit inventorying—a “Honeytoken quantifier” and a “Honeytoken pro-
grammer”. Both components are implemented on a programmable networked
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Quantifier
Central Database
Actual Items
Read tokensProgramDe-activate
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Fig. 5. The figure shows the general architecture of Mirage. The RFID reader reads
data from tags (honeytokens and actual tags), downloads information from the central
database on actual items in the inventory, calculates the number of honeytokens that
needs to be programmed (to make the sales pattern look random), determines random
IDs for the programmed honeytokens, and finally programs the tokens. The reader
determines the actual tokens from the collection and sends an inventory on the real
tags.
RFID reader. The “Honeytoken quantifier” determines the number of honeyto-
kens that should be activated (or deactivated) such that both sales and restocking
trends are randomized or flattened. It reads item tags and data from a secure
back-end database to determine the actual sales and restocking numbers. It uses
this information and a user-defined goal (of a random or flat distribution) in
Algorithm 1 to determine the number of “fake” honeytokens to activate (or de-
activate). In Mirage, the reader collects three important input parameters from
back-end database tables: (1) the RFID tag IDs of honeytokens, (2) RFID tag
IDs corresponding to real objects, and (3) the age of honeytokens. The “Hon-
eytoken programmer” uses the identifiers for the actual and honeytoken tags to
determine the IDs that new honeytokens should be programmed with.
4.1 Honeytoken Quantifier
Mirage defines the notion of a goal that the honeytoken management system
should meet. The goal of Mirage could be to portray a flat or a random sales
and restocking trend to an attacker. For instance, flat sales would always show
constant sales to an individual performing illicit inventorying. To meet this goal,
Mirage either activates or de-activates a set of honeytokens. Programming a
honeytoken is equivalent to restocking one item on the shelf. De-activating a
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Algorithm 1 Honeytoken Quantifier Algorithm (at time ti)
Input: G— sales or restocking goal, Av—average age of items
loop
For every Honeytoken H
Increment Age(H) by one
if Age(H) > Av deactivate token
end loop
loop
S(ti) = sales between time ti−1 and ti
R(ti) = restocking between time ti−1 and ti
while S(ti) < G deactivate random token
while R(ti) < G activate random unused token
end loop
honeytoken amounts to a sales event from an attacker’s perspective. The Mi-
rage quantifier uses a simple history-based algorithm to calculate the number of
honeytokens that should be programmed or de-activated.
Flat distribution goal: A flat distribution presents a nearly-constant sales and
inventory trend to attackers. In our evaluation, we set the flat distribution goal
of Mirage to 10% more than the maximum sales in the previous month. However,
this goal can be tuned to the availability of honeytokens at the warehouse. For
instance, if only x honeytokens are available and y is maximum number of actual
items on the shelf at any time, the goal could be set close to x+ y. Mirage uses
the actual sales for an itemtype (difference in the number of items in the present
and previous reader scan) and de-activates |G − S| honeytokens—G is the flat
distribution goal and S is the number of actual items sold. Similarly, to meet
a restocking goal of Gi, Mirage activates |Gi − I| dead honeytokens, where I is
the actual number of items restocked.
Random distribution: Another plausible goal is to depict a random distri-
bution to the attacker. To this end, Mirage uses a simple adaptation of the flat
distribution approach. Mirage chooses a random sales or restocking goal for every
time step—for example, this goal could be to show sales or restocking anywhere
between the maximum and 100 + y% of the past maximum sales or restocking.
Consequently, using the same technique as above, Mirage deactivates or activates
a certain number of honeytokens. A primary challenge here is to assure that the
random number generated on the RFID reader is truly random. We rigorously
evaluate the randomness of our output trend using autocorrelation measures in
§5.
Mirage can also depict a flat or random total inventory trend. This is accom-
plished by a combination of sales and restocking goals. For instance, if the goal
is to depict a flat inventory, Mirage tries to achieve a flat sales and restocking
goal, the combination of which automatically leads to a flat inventory goal.
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Object Type (32 bits) Object ID (32 bits)
unique to a particular objectunique to an object type
(e.g., milk, fruit)
Fig. 6. The figure shows the breakdown of a honeytoken tag. The first 32 bits represent
the type of the object (EPC code). The next 32 bits represent the exact object.
4.2 Practical Issues
Using Mirage to circumvent illicit inventorying presents a number of practical
issues. The most critical ones relate to the age of a honeytoken and the read
overhead induced by the additional tags.
Honeytoken age: If the honeytoken IDs are not changed frequently, the at-
tacker can isolate these from the real tags. For example, an attacker can watch
the age distribution of a tag on the shelf—and use this distribution to distinguish
the real tags from fake ones. To circumvent the above problem, Mirage ages the
deployed honeytokens. Mirage uses past history to determine the average age of a
real tag on the shelf. If the age of a honeytoken is equal to the average age of real
tags, the tag is reprogrammed with a random ID. Although this reprogramming
accounts for one sales and one restocking event (potentially skewing results), it
ensures that the attacker can not easily isolate an actual tag from a honeytoken.
Further, it induces randomization in the inventorying process. Similarly, while
deactivating honeytokens, tags whose age is equal or more than the average age
of real tags are preferred. This ensures that the age of honeytoken tags follow a
similar distribution as the age of the actual tags—mitigating the threat of their
exposure.
Read overhead: Another practical problem is a result of the interference pro-
duced by the additional tokens. RFID tags respond to readers using a shared
channel. Therefore, a large number of honeytokens can potentially lead to sub-
stantial collisions, incurring high read and reprogramming latencies. The solution
to the above problem is to explore the trade-off between the following two pa-
rameters: “how flat or random do we want the sales and restocking events to
appear to an attacker” and “how much overhead is acceptable in terms of the
number of honeytokens used”. Though in Mirage, we do not explicitly optimize
for this overhead, in our evaluation we experiment with different number of hon-
eytokens to determine what the “optimal” number should be such that the sales
and restocking trend are randomized (or flattened) and the overhead associated
with reading from and programming honeytokens is minimized.
Algorithm 1 is the core Mirage algorithm that determines which honeytoken
tag should be programmed. It comprises of three major components. First, it
keeps track of the age of a honeytoken. Using history, it determines the average
age of an actual tag and uses it to decide whether a honeytoken should be
reprogrammed. It tries to match a user-defined goal, and if depicted sales or
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restocking is more or less than the goal, a certain number of honeytokens are
activated or deactivated. One of the primary goals of our system is simplicity.
While more involved statistical techniques can be used to solve the problem,
the trade-off lies in system complexity which directly effects the adoptability of
the system. We show in our evaluation that the simple intuitive scheme used in
Mirage suffices to solve the problem. Moreover, we believe that this would lead
to easy adoption of Mirage by state-of-the-art retail stores such as Wal-Mart.
4.3 Honeytoken programmer
Activating or deactivating honeytokens is simple in Mirage. Every tag has a
32 bit identifier that is unique to an object. Another 32 bits are used to store
information on the “type” of item (the schema of the tag is shown in Figure 6).
When activating a tag, Mirage scans through all the tag IDs in the database
and generates a new random ID—an ID that is not assigned to any other tag.
The Item type field on the tag (first 32 bits) is kept exactly the same as the
items on the shelf. When deactivating the tag, Mirage programs the item-type
32 bits with a random number. Hence, an attacker sees a different object type
and automatically removes it from his list.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate Mirage with emphasis on two key questions.
• Does Mirage obfuscate sales and restocking trends—does Mirage meet a flat
or random trend goal ?
• What is the overhead in terms of reading and reprogramming honeytokens
associated with Mirage ?
5.1 Experimental Setup and Methodology
For our evaluation, we use a real warehouse setup. The warehouse is an experi-
mental center built specifically to run realistic tests on RFID-based inventorying.
Figure 7 is a picture of the aisle in the experimental warehouse where items are
stored. These are real items sold at a Wal-Mart like store—therefore, practical
issues such as reading delays due to metal and water still hold in our experi-
ments. We use an off-the-shelf Windows-Mobile compatible Motorola MC9090
handheld RFID reader and over 450 Gen2 low cost RFID tags manufactured by
Avery-Dennison in our experiments (see Figure 8). The reader has a range of
approximately 3.5 meters.
A major challenge to realistic evaluation of Mirage is emulating real sales-
restocking trends. Moreover, realistic evaluation using data presented in §2 would
take years of experimentation. To expedite our evaluation, we use a “time con-
traction” approach. As an input to our experiments in the warehouse, we use the
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aisle and tagged items in experimental warehouse shelves in the warehouse
Fig. 7. The figure shows the warehouse where our experiments were conducted. The
warehouse very closely mimics an actual Wal-Mart like stockroom.
RFID Antenna
Windows Mobile Compatible System
Fig. 8. The figure shows the Motorola RFID reader used in our experiments.
inventory from the three examples in §2. Though the data in §2 was collected
over a period of several months, the number of data points usually correspond
to the number of scans done in the retail store. Instead of waiting for an entire
day (sometimes several days) for a scan, we speed up the process by performing
a scan, followed by removing/adding items to the shelf (corresponding to the
actual data), and then immediately performing the second scan. Each scan cor-
responds to one time step in our experiment. For adding honeytokens, we follow
a similar approach. We determine the honeytokens that need to be programmed
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Fig. 9. The figure shows the flattened in-
ventory trend for data in Figure 2. Using
Mirage, the discount sales trend cannot be
visually distinguished.
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Fig. 10. The figure shows the flattened in-
ventory trend for data in Figure 3. Mirage
successfully flattens the restocking events.
and used in a particular time step and scatter them with the real items on the
shelves. Consequently, we perform a read using the RFID reader. We present
read and programming latency results in §5.4.
5.2 De-trending sales and restocking
Our first set of experiments evaluate de-trending restocking and discount sales
for the first two scenarios in §2. Figure 9 shows the results of using Mirage to
flatten inventory trends corresponding to data in Figure 2 and Figure 10 presents
the results of flattening inventory trend corresponding to data in Figure 3. In
the first example, the goal is to hide the discount event from an attacker and
in the second example, the goal is to obfuscate the restocking events. 37 and 20
honeytokens were used for the two experiments respectively. From the results, we
make two observations. First, Mirage uses honeytokens intelligently to produce
a near-flat inventory to an attacker and successfully hides possible trends in the
data. Second, we observe that in-spite of adding honeytokens, the number of
tags read are less than in the actual data. This anomaly is explained by the read
success probability of RFID tags. When a RFID reader tries to read tags in a
retail-store environment, the probability of reading all the tags is less than 1
due to RF collisions, physical interference from metal or water, and tags that
are at the edge of the reader range. In our warehouse setting, we found that
82% of the tags were read on average during the 50 separate inventories, with
the best inventory success rate of 89% and the worst inventory success rate of
57%. We also note that these results correspond to the case where Mirage needs
to provide a combination of flat sales and flat restocking such that the overall
inventory trend is flat.
Figure 11 shows the results of applying Mirage to the sales trends in Figure 1.
This experiment shows a limitation of trying to obtain a flat distribution for
certain scenarios. We observe that for Item-2, the sales trend is still visually
distinct. This is because Mirage uses the maximum sales from the previous month
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Fig. 11. The figure shows the results of the sales trend presented to an attacker by
Mirage. The goal in this experiment was to obtain a flat sales distribution. Mirage
does not obtain a flat distribution due to two factors, (1) the flat goal for a month
is calculated as a function of the sales in the previous months, and (2) the success
probability of the RFID reader to read a honeytoken tag in a warehouse is less than
100%.
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Fig. 12. The figure shows the results of the sales trend presented to an attacker by
Mirage. The goal in this experiment was to obtain a random sales distribution.
to determine the goal for the present month. As the sales pattern in Figure 1
has large variance, the resulting goals for each month oscillates, revealing the
actual trend in some cases. Also every scan does not read all the RFID tags—in
this experiment, 68% of the total inventory was captured on average during the
36 separate scans, with 82% being captured in the best case and 33% captured
in the worst case.
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Fig. 13. The figure shows the correlogram (autocorrelation at different lags) for original
sales trend in Figure 3 and the correlogram after using Mirage.
To mitigate the above problem, we set our goal to a random distribution.
This goal is set to the maximum number of items on the shelf in the previous
month and an additional random number between 0 and the total number of
honeytokens. The results for the random-goal experiment is shown in Figure 12
where 150 separate inventories were performed. To show whether the trends were
near-random, we present a correlogram for the data in Figure 13. A correlogram
is an autocorrelation plot for different time lags. If data is truly random, the
autocorrelation at different lags would be close to 0—we observe the autocor-
relation coefficients are closer to zero for Mirage as compared to the original
data.
5.3 Tradeoff with number of honeytokens
We next study the trade-off between the number of honeytokens and the degree
of randomness produced by Mirage. Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows the trend
that the attacker sees when the number of honeytokens is 100%, 150%, and 300%
of the total number of items. Note that our random goal in these experiments
is a function of the number of honeytokens. Though other random goals are
equally applicable, here we show that this simple function can produce desirable
results in practice. Adding more honeytokens produces more rises and falls in
the output trend—indication of better random output. However, this random-
ness comes at a cost of additional time to read the honeytokens. For example,
for “3x honeytokens”, when over 400 tags were in use simultaneously for each
inventory the read-success of scans reduced considerably. For instance, on over-
age, 56% of the tagged items were read, with a high of 84% and a low of 15% on
particular inventories. We anticipate that we would have obtained much better
results had we scanned at a slower pace—effectively increasing the latency of
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Fig. 14. The figure shows the sales trend seen by an attacker for Mirage with different
number of honeytokens. This figure is only for item 1 in Figure 1.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Day
S
a
le
s
 
 
Item 2 (original data)
Mirage (1x honeytokens)
Mirage (1.5x honeytokens)
Mirage (3x honeytokens)
Fig. 15. The figure shows the sales trend seen by an attacker for Mirage with different
number of honeytokens. This figure is only for item 2 in Figure 1.
inventorying. For our experiments, we walked up the warehouse aisles at the
same speed regardless of the number of RFID tags on the shelf. Figure 16 shows
the correlogram for different number of honeytokens. Although the correlogram
gets flatter with more honeytokens, the additional benefit diminishes. Therefore,
using 1x honeytokens presents a near optimal trade-off between randomness in
the output data and overhead latency.
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Fig. 16. The figure shows the correlogram (autocorrelation at different lags), for dif-
ferent number of honeytokens. As the number of honeytokens increases, the autocor-
relation coefficient for different lags get closer to zero.
5.4 Overhead
Mirage adds overhead to the inventory process in terms of additional tag-read
and tag-programming (write) latency. If this latency is large per actual item
read, retail store moguls such as Wal-Mart will eschew adopting Mirage. To
quantify this overhead, we perform an evaluation of the additional read and
write latency induced by Mirage. The read results were collected as part of the
previous experiments and the write experiments were performed separately in
a laboratory environment. Figure 17 is a cumulative distribution function of
the amount of time taken by our RFID reader to read honeytoken tags and
Figure 18 is a CDF of the latency to reprogram a honeytoken tag. Figure 17 is
calculated over 12,000 reads and Figure 18 is calculated over 55 writes. The read
latency is always less than 150 ms and the write latency varies from 90 ms to
350 ms. Clearly the additional overhead induced by adding honeytokens is small
as compared to solutions such as privacy zones [7]. Therefore, Mirage can be
used to de-trend sales, restocking, and inventory trend with minimal additional
overhead.
6 Related Work
Illicit inventorying is known to be a serious problem for RFID-enabled retail
store environments. However, efforts to mitigate illicit inventorying is sparse
in the literature—limited to a few research efforts. Here, we review previous
literature that is most relevant and related to Mirage.
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Fig. 17. The figure shows a cumulative
probability distribution of the amount of
time taken to read a honeytoken by our
reader. The overhead associated with read-
ing additional tags is small—less than 150
ms.
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Fig. 18. The figure shows a cumulative
probability distribution of the amount of
time taken to reprogram a honeytoken
tag (for activation and de-activation). This
overhead varies from 90 ms to 350 ms.
6.1 Illicit Inventorying
Two techniques have been proposed in the past for mitigating illicit inventory-
ing. The first method [8] uses an active device that can mimic several tags at
once. When an attacker performs an unauthorized inventory, several false ids are
transmitted using the active device to the illicit reader. The device houses a mi-
crocontroller that can execute logic to decide what to transmit. Such devices are
available for purchase [13], and they have been shown to operate as described.
However, the disadvantages of this solution include dollar cost, constant power
to the active device, and conspicuous size that makes it easily noticeable to at-
tackers. Also, the devices require extensive upfront programming so that the
identification values that are transmitted would not interfere with actual inven-
torying. A complimentary approach proposed is the idea of a blocker tag [6].
This is a specially designed tag that spams out several hundred random ids to
all readers in range. This tag could be carried by an individual when they do
not want someone to illicitly scan the items they are carrying. Though patented,
such a device is not available for purchase. However, apart from the additional
cost of designing such a tag (which is a huge deterrent for retail stores like Wal-
Mart), the latency of reading an actual tag during a legitimate inventory could
be huge—one tag broadcasts a large number of random IDs, potentially jamming
the RF channel.
6.2 Honeytokens usage
Also related to Mirage is the concept of honeytokens. Honeytokens have been
used in personally identifiable information (PII) databases to detect unautho-
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rized access [12, 11, 16]. In industrial applications, privacy laws prohibit indi-
viduals from accessing personal information that they do not have a valid use
for [10]. Detecting when unauthorized access has occurred is difficult, as the
data requirements for applications and users vary greatly. Honeytokens, which
have no valid business use by definition as they are synthetic, are generated
and then inserted into areas where users might be tempted to access them. The
honeytokens are monitored and if an individual accesses the record, alarms are
generated. The honeytokens are generated in large amounts so that the proba-
bility of a malicious user encountering them is increased. Honeytokens work well
in personal information databases as it is relatively easy to make large amounts
of synthetic PII data that looks real and very valuable to an attacker [14]. How-
ever, in Mirage, we use honeytokens to add random noise to sales and restocking
in retail store environment which is a completely different application domain.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate Mirage, a system to mitigate
the threat of illicit inventorying by an attacker in an environment that uses RFID
tags. Mirage uses a concept of honeytokens, additional programmable RFID tags,
to inject random noise in a retail store environment. Through a history-based
algorithm on the RFID reader, Mirage determines the number of honeytokens
to activate or de-activate such that the attacker sees a random or flat sales
or restocking trend. Through exhaustive evaluation in an actual experimental
warehouse using an off-the-shelf RFID reader and inexpensive tags, we show that
Mirage successfully de-trends sales and restocking events while adding minimal
overhead to the inventorying process.
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